Honduras

Here is a link to an article that I found about the situation in Honduras. Apparently, there is a media war between the government and the deposed president. It also explains the succession of events. It is very interesting.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/world/americas/25honduras.html?ref=americas

Here is a link to a very interesting blog that I found. I hope you like it also.
warnewsupdates.biogspot.com

Social Imperatives

The topic that I will be writing about today is of the social imperatives of the Taliban, the lack of any women’s rights under Taliban control, and the lack of a lasting solution through military force.

The Taliban is an anti-modernism tribal-based organization that is based on an interpretation of the Koran. Their original purpose was to remove the unjust dictators that had ruled over Afghanistan for many years, but in the end they turned out to be just as bad.

Something that is very important to understand is that in Afghanistan the entire culture is built around the ideology of the Koran and because of this their world is utterly different than that of any western society that I know of. We also must understand that though most of the population is Muslim there as always are many interpretations of the social imperatives of the religion. The Taliban have a very strict understanding of what the Islamic beliefs are. Their reign over Afghanistan from 1996-2001 was a time of fear and strict control for a large portion of the Afghanis. One of the major problems that most people in the west have a problem with is the Taliban’s treatment of women.

In an explanation of the situation for women in Afghanistan Abdullah Qazi says that, “Over 1400 years ago, Islam demanded that men and women be equal before God, and gave them various rights such as the right to inheritance, the right to vote, the right to work, and even choose their own partners in marriage. For centuries now in Afghanistan, women have been denied these rights either by official government decree or by their own husbands, fathers, and brothers. During the rule of the Taliban (1996 - 2001), women were treated worse than in any other time or by any other society. They were forbidden to work, leave the house without a male escort, not allowed to seek medical help from a male doctor, and forced to cover themselves from head to toe, even covering their eyes. Women who were doctors and teachers before, suddenly were forced to be beggars and even prostitutes in order to feed their families.”

Though the Taliban share many basic fundamentals with a large number of people. There are some things that are in their belief that one must question what must be done to stop these ideals for the benefit of Afghanistan.

When the United States began their campaign to “fix” Afghanistan there were many things that they did not understand. We must look at what other solutions to the problem there are rather then just sending more troops to fight an ever-growing insurgency. It seems that we might be the cause for the Taliban’s growth as well as causing harm to the Afghani people. In 2005, walking round Zafaraniya, a poor suburb of Baghdad, an American battalion commander Colonel Brian Doser (who is also a civil engineer) showed the new sewage and clean water systems that he and his team had installed. "We should have done this much sooner," he volunteered. And then he made a really persuasive point. "You can't wait for the security problem to be solved before you work on reconstruction," he said. “For the Campaign in Afghanistan to be a success we must look to finding solutions that help stop the problem and not to perpetuate it.” The Taliban’s beliefs make diplomacy very hard, but military force is not a lasting solution either. As Colonel Brian Doser says, "If you wait to solve the security problem before you improve the infrastructure, you may never solve the security problem."

From what I understand, the problems that face the American and local military in Afghanistan involves a lack of ability to change the beliefs of part of the society that the Taliban has created. Without this kind of change there can’t be a significant improvement in the living conditions for the people, specifically the women.

Kalo

http://www.afghan-web.com/woman/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/8274993.stm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taliban#Origin

Corruption in Afghanistan

What is corruption? Dictionary.com has several definitions, but they all relate back to perversion of morality. In the case of Afghanistan, the governmental corruption is an issue of the government functioning for the advantage of its own members and colleagues in many instances rather than the good of its country’s people.

As reported by the New York Times in “Afghan corruption: Everything for sale”, the main issue driving the corruption here is money. Free passage through neighborhoods in Kabul, acquittal, governmental position--in fact, everything--is bought and sold for outrageous prices, whether outrageously high or outrageously low. Favoritism and backroom deals, particularly energized by loyalties and the opium trade, fuel almost every transaction in the streets, in the offices, and even in the government.

In a developing country like Afghanistan, the Times says, corruption is not unusual. But unfortunately for the welfare of the Afghan people, it has taken a complete hold all the way to the top—President Karzai openly admits the corruption within his own government, and, as is evident from the recent questions in the election fraud and bribes coming to his own family, is not immune to it himself. With a fairly weak government placed precariously on a toppled Taliban rule, lack of checks and balances leaves the doors wide open for bribery and hypocrisy. The Taliban, as well, with its ever-strengthening “shadow government”, pulls many of the strings related to the everyday life of the people.

Despite the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan, an outside force cannot eliminate corruption, even while working closely with the corrupt for change. Corruption is an internal issue at heart, and is, in fact, is an issue *of* the heart.

Afghan corruption: Everything for sale
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/world/asia/02iht-corrupt.1.19050534.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1

US troops in Afganistan

The United States of America has many troops located in Afganistan, which affects the life of many normal Afganis. Considering we have 68,000 plus troops who live there, eat there, fight there, and try to ensure no riots or terrorist attacks happen it affects the life of the people group. How the US is perceived in Afganistan by the common people will go a long way to determine our future relationship with the entire region. Many people blame policies of the past for the deep US resentment in the region.

One of the political realities President Obama faces is this is a very unpopular war. In a resent New York Times article the war in Afganistan waas compared to Vietnam. This will affect the policys made because there will be heavy resistince made on any effort that is not pulling our troops out. Many of his own supporters, according to Marie Cocco, who supported his decision in his campaign to pull troops from Iraq and concentrate efforts in Afganistan, are now weary of war and want our troops out altogether. Yet, there are many of his own supporters who believe that the precense of US troops in Afganistan is absolutely essential to win the war on terror. An ardent support of Obama, Marie Cocco states, "They forget why we are in Afganistan-that it was here in this faraway land of poverty, tribal animosities, and historical hostility toward outsiders that a sophisticated terrorist network was allowed to take root, to flourish and plot the spectacular attack. (9/11) Afganistan today is once again such a couldron" Clearly President Obama is facing a difficult decision on what to do with US troops.

Main Crop and Economic Drivers of Afghanistan and how this effects the political situation.

Main Crop:

There are many crops in Afghanistan. Such as wheat, barley, apricots, grapes, mulberries, walnuts, almonds, melons, tomatoes, potatoes, onions



The main fruit crop of Afghanistan according to A.R. Manan, former Research Director in the Ministry of Agriculture, says that mulberry is the the primary fruit crop. It is grown by almost every farm-family. It is sold both fresh and dried.



Grown in all areas of Afghanistan, wheat is another important crop. Something interesting that I found out about growing wheat there is that 90% of wheat is fall-planted, and of course 10% is planted in the spring.



Economic Driver:
The economic driver in Afghanistan is opium. "Opium is narcotic formed from the latex released by lacerating the immature seed pods of opium poppies. It contains 12% morphine, an opiate alkaloid, which is most frequently processed chemically to produce heroin for the illegal drug trade."[3]


How this effects the political situation:
As the economic driver in Afghanistan being opium, the effects are more widespread than just the political situation; it also effects the country as a whole. My thought is that no Afghan politician is going to be against the sales of opium, because without the sales Afghanistan as a country would fail economically. For example; lobbyist pay an abundance of money to speak to senators and influence which bills are and are not passed. Opium dealers bribe Afghan politicians to "look the other way" while they produce opium. Afghanistan's politicians may tell other world leaders that they will do something about opium, but they won't because of the economic impact it has.

~Emilie A.

Sources:
1-Seed and Crop Improvement situation assessment in Afghanistan
2-The Economist
3- Wikipedia

Our New Topic

This blog is dedicated to understanding the news. The next project of the class is to figure out the why of the Honduran political crisis. To begin I advise our followers and contributors to have a look at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/world/americas/28honduras.html?scp=2&sq=Honduras&st=c

Prerequisites of Democracy

What are the prerequisites of democracy?
(Information taken from wikipedia)
~Causes (prerequisites) of democracy: There is considerable debate about the factors which affect or ultimately limit democratization. A great many things, including economics, culture, and history, have been cited as impacting on the process. Some of the more frequently mentioned factors are: Wealth(GDP/capita), Education, Capitalism, Social equality, the existence of a Middle class, Culture, and Homogeneous population.

Do these prerequisites exist in Afghanistan?
Simply put, No. These prerequisites are, for the most part nonexistent in Afghanistan at the present.

If not, can they be implanted by a foreign power?
I'd say probably not.
~Quote from Hoover Digest - Democracy in Afghanistan? Don't Hold Your Breath By Robert J. Barro
"The Western ideal for representative democracy involves free, multiparty elections and maintenance of civil liberties. As Aristotle realized, and as the evidence from a large number of countries demonstrates, democracy is almost never sustained in a country that has income and education levels as low as those in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Washington always recommends democracy, even to the poorest nations, and the results have included such failures as the new Congo and Haiti.
"Freedom House's latest ratings place Afghanistan in the lowest categories for electoral rights and civil liberties. This lack of democracy corresponds to the predictions I would make from the country's economic and social conditions. Given where Afghanistan is today, my statistical analysis implies that the chance a midrange democracy - characteristic at present of countries such as Turkey and Indonesia - will exist five years from now is less than 1 percent."

Like a River flowing into a swamp

After reading the latest posts perhaps it would be helpful to introduce an idea called interestingly coin theory. This is not a theory on what size the quarter should be but rather a military idea that is an acronym for counter insurgency theory. The ideas that whirl around this can be succinctly explored in a post from SWJ which is linked on this blog. For a full url, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/a-few-random-thoughts-on-coin/

The point of this idea is trying to clearly define the objective of the mission before you begin and to fully recognize the idea that when America is operating in a sovereign country the responsibility for the counter insurgency would seem to lie with the host country. Operationally as we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan this can be difficult to say the least. President Obama and his many qualified advisers are wrestling with the difficult life changing decisions regarding increasing American troop number in Afghanistan.

The reason to discuss this on the blog is to give us all pause and to consider the concluding "random thought " by the author of the previously recommended blog,

Can there be victory in the conventional sense in COIN? Or is it more along these lines: “Someday, if you are successful, the mission will disappear, like a river flowing into a swamp.”

Which leads me to my final random thought: If you have to win a fight you send the Army and the Marines. If you have to help someone else win a fight without taking over the fight (and if it is going to take 10 or more years to reach a satisfactory conclusion), then perhaps another type of force is needed.

Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army, is a Special Forces officer with command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, Germany, the Philippines, and CONUS, and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth and the National War College, National Defense University. The opinions he expresses in this paper are his own and represent no U.S. Government or Department of Defense positions.

Taliban

Who are the Taliban?
(Information from infoplease.com)
The Taliban ("Students of Islamic Knowledge Movement") ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001. They came to power during Afghanistan's long civil war. Although they managed to hold 90% of the country's territory, their policies—including their treatment of women and support of terrorists—ostracized them from the world community. The Taliban was ousted from power in December 2001 by the U.S. military and Afghani opposition forces in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S.

Why did they want the election thrwarted?
(infomation from newsweek)
Taliban subcommander Mullah Saleh Khan—who, in the insurgent hierarchy, is the equivalent of a U.S. Army lieutenant leading a unit of 40 to 50 fighters—used to be nonchalant about Thursday's presidential election. His cohorts in southern Afghanistan's Helmand province, where the Taliban's nearly eight-year-old insurgency is perhaps the strongest, felt so empowered until this summer that they hardly noticed an election was coming. Then the Marines arrived in July, beginning an intense campaign of heliborne operations to disrupt the insurgents.
That's when the Taliban put two and two together. "We didn't take the election seriously until the Americans started arriving in larger numbers with more and better equipment than ever before," says Khan. "Once we realized how important it was for the Americans to secure the election for their puppet Karzai and his corrupt government, it became equally important for us to try and stop it." Since then, they have done their best to undermine the election's legitimacy by keeping voter turnout to a bare minimum. The Taliban high command warned people to stay away from the polls and, according to Khan, villagers are so "angry, fearful, and sad" by the surge of 4,000 Marines in Helmand that they will stay home on Thursday. "Everywhere there is the smell of blood," he confidently tells a NEWSWEEK reporter in a meeting on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, "so who will dare to go vote?"

Is the Taliban gathering strength among the pashtun people?
well,According to thenation.com the taliban is not gathering strength from the pashtuns.

The Election Dilemma

“The core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” The U.S. Embassy web site states this goal with clarity. However, the hope of achieving this goal currently rests on Afghanistan’s contested election results.
The United States is in a difficult dilemma. While public support for the Afghan War seems to be falling in the U.S., questions have been raised as to the validity of the election results. Election officials are recounting about ten percent of the ballots. If incumbent President Hamid Karzai receives more than fifty percent of the vote, then he will be declared the winner. America would then know exactly where they stand with the Afghan government and could move forward with their goals. Deciding on counterinsurgency strategy and fighting government corruption would top the list. However, if Karzai is awarded less than fifty percent of the vote, then a runoff election would take place. The elections could then be delayed until spring, setting back the United States and her allies in their plans at a time when indecision is not an option.
It is important, though, that the United States does everything possible to promote the democratic elections in Afghanistan. This is indeed essential to success in the War on Terror. “A runoff would be preferable to a discredited first-round Karzai victory,” Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution told The New York Times. The U.S. envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, has encouraged Karzai to accept the election results, even if it means having a runoff election with Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Karzai, however, fears that this will spark ethnic violence.
The fact remains that a stable, legitimate government is necessary in order for the U.S. to move forward in Afghanistan. The New York Times reports, “‘There is an exquisite dilemma here,’ said Bruce Riedel... ‘The strategy requires an Afghan government that is credible and legitimate, both to get Afghans to support it and to get Americans and their allies to help.’”
http://www.uspolicy.be/issues/afghanistan/afghanistan.asp
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6813478.ece
http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Warns_Karzai_On_Fraud_Corruption_Military_Ties/1809368.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/asia/18policy.html?scp=1&sq=Afganistan%20elections&st=cse

The Definitions.

To understand what is happening in Afghanistan, I believe that you must first have a basic understanding of some of the words that you here all the time in writing and in the other forms of media. Here are some words that I found that I thought would be good to really understand.

Definitions.

All Definitions are from wikepidia.com

Jihadi international.

Jihadi or jihadi international is a political neologism referring to an individual who participates in advancing Jihad

Jihad.

an Islamic term, is a religious duty of Muslims. In Arabic, the word jihād is a noun meaning "struggle." Jihad appears frequently in the Qur'an and common usage as the idiomatic expression "striving in the way of Allah (al-jihad fi sabil Allah)".[1][2] A person engaged in jihad is called a mujahid, the plural is mujahideen.

Allah.

Allah (Arabic: الله‎, Allāh, IPA: [ʔalˤːɑːh]  ( listen)) is the standard Arabic word for God.[1] While the term is best known in the West for its use by Muslims as a reference to God, it is used by Arabic-speakers of all Abrahamic faiths, including Christians and Jews, in reference to "God".[1][2][3] The term was also used by pagan Meccans as a reference to the creator-god, possibly the supreme deity in pre-Islamic Arabia.[4]

 

Caliphate.

The term caliphate (from the Arabic خلافة or khilāfa) refers to the first form of government inspired by Islam. It was initially led by Muhammad's disciples as a continuation of the political authority the prophet established, known as the 'rashidun caliphates'. It represented the political unity of the Muslim Ummah. The term is also used to refer to a state which implements such a government.

 

Pronouncing Arabic words and names.

Although word stress is not phonemically contrastive in Standard Arabic, it does bear a strong relationship to vowel length. The basic rules are:

1   Only one of the last three syllables may be stressed.

2   Given this restriction, the last "superheavy" syllable (containing a long vowel or ending in a consonant) is stressed.

3    If there is no such syllable, the pre-final syllable is stressed if it is 'heavy.' Otherwise, the first allowable syllable is stressed.

4    In Standard Arabic, a final long vowel may not be stressed. (This restriction does not apply to the spoken dialects, where original final long vowels have been shortened and secondary final long vowels have arisen.)

For example: ki-TAA-bun "book", KAA-ti-bun "writer", MAK-ta-bun "desk", ma-KAA-ti-bun "desks", mak-TA-ba-tun "library", KA-ta-buu (MSA) "they wrote" = KA-ta-bu (dialect), ka-ta-BUU-hu (MSA) "they wrote it" = ka-ta-BUU (dialect), ka-TA-ba-taa (MSA) "they (dual, fem) wrote", ka-TAB-tu (MSA) "I wrote" = ka-TABT (dialect). Doubled consonants count as two consonants: ma-JAL-la "magazine", ma-HALL "place".

Qur'an.

The Qur’an^[1] (Arabic: القرآن‎ al-qur’ān, literally “the recitation”; also sometimestransliterated as Quran, Qur’ān, Koran, Alcoran or Al-Qur’ān) is the centralreligious text of Islam. Muslims believe the Qur’an to be the book of divine guidance and direction for mankind, and consider the original Arabic text to be the final revelation of God.^[2][3][4][5]

Islam holds that the Qur’an was revealed to Muhammad by the angel Jibrīl(Gabriel) over a period of approximately twenty-three years, beginning in 610 CE, when he was forty, and concluding in 632 CE, the year of his death.^[2][6][7] Followers of Islam further believe that the Qur’an was written down by Muhammad's companions while he was alive, although the primary method of transmission was oral. Muslim tradition agrees that it was fixed in writing shortly after Muhammad's death by order of the caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar^[8], and that their orders began a process of formalization of the orally transmitted text that was completed under their successor Uthman with the standard edition known as the "Uthmanic recension."^[9] The present form of the Qur’an is accepted by most scholars as the original version authored or dictated by Muhammad.

Please add any terms that you believe need defining.

Kalo.

religion in Afghanistan

Acccording to Afghanistan's.com, 99% of Afghgans are Muslim. It does not seem as if the Afghans have many fueds because of a Mullah ( Religious teacher who solves social, personal, and health problems). Most of the fighting that goes on is between the Taliban and locals. The Taliban Mullah is one of the greatest Afghan community leaders, therefore eliminates disputes. Their are few indeed Christians in Afghanistan, but they sill influence other sections of Afghanistan. There is not as much fighting between the religious groups as there are just plain outlaws and tribes who steal and raid cities.

The Pashtun Culture: Differences and similarities

Most people assume that the majority of Afghanistan's population is made of Afghans. That would make sense, and politically, it is true. But on a cultural level, Afghanistan is primarily filled with Pashtun people, a culture that dates back to the 13th century.

These people have a unique culture that revolves around a code of honor called the Pashtunwali. The ideas in this document include milmastia (hospitality); tureh (courage); badal (revenge); and ghayrat (protection of one's honor) ( http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Afghanistan-to-Bosnia-Herzegovina/Pashtun.html)

These few ideas are the basis of a culture that has been present in the middle east for several ages. But, make no mistake, the pashtun culture does have its flaws. Differences between Tribes, clans, and families are causes of bloody violence, and social problems. The goals of tureh, and ghayrat can make for some sticky situations between tribes. The heritage of Pashtun families dictate that revenge must be taken to protect ones honor, to the point of battles, or murder.

There is some speculation that the Pashtun subculture is aiding The Taliban, protecting them, and providing resource. However, it is not logical to assume that because part of a society chooses to take action, the whole society is guilty of taking the same action. In each Clan and family there is different viewpoints, and opinions; just as there is in any other society, culture, or organization. For example, it is very true that some Pashtun people are just as extreme as those leaders and groups that believe that America, but other groups believe quite the opposite. The Global Pashtun Institute for peace and Democracy gives a perfect illustration of how the culture is diverse in more then one way. On GPIPD's website it states the following:

Mission Statement

The mission of Global Pashtun Institute for Peace and Democracy (GPIPD) is to promote and secure peace, democracy, human rights and development in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and interact with academia, think tanks, and other stakeholders for the achievement of its goals and objectives.

Description

GPIPD is guided by the following principles and ideas:

• The principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
• International peace and security, democracy, freedom, social justice and free market economy;
• Democratic pluralism, and equal rights for all without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, gender and political belief;
• The principles of secularism, as opposed to religious extremism, violence and terrorism;
• Non-violence, humanism, tolerance and peaceful coexistence;
• The idea of threat reduction, including threats posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the region and the prevention of war and armed conflict, emphasizing on the solution of conflicts through peaceful, negotiated settlement;
• Mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual respect in the relationship between all states, nations and ethnic groups;
• Equal rights of all peoples, nationalities and ethnic groups to develop their own socio-economic and cultural life, including equal opportunities for all without exception;
• The idea that peace, stability and development in Southwest Asia is in the interests of all peoples and governments in the region and the international community;
• The principles of the Pashtun social philosophy traditionally based on democratic norms of Pashtunwali (Pashtun way of life) which, in essence, is forward looking and open to reform and modernity.

Its important to realize that although some parts a culture may have a certain mindset, it is unwise to group all the people in that mindset. Clearly there are differences in the ideas, and beliefs of the people in Afghanistan. If our political leaders and military strategists would use this fact to our advantage the situation in Afghanistan would have a higher possibility of success. Instead of clumping all afghan people into a radical extremist group, we should make different strategies for different regions, aiding those that promote democracy, and furthering their ideals.

The FPI and the Project for the New American Century

The U.S. Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI) is a classic case of those organizations we know of but not about. Its website states that it is a non-partisan, non-profit organization with these objectives in mind: (1)

• continued U.S. engagement--diplomatic, economic, and military—in the world and rejection of policies that would lead us down the path to isolationism;
• robust support for America’s democratic allies and opposition to rogue regimes that threaten American interests;
• the human rights of those oppressed by their governments, and U.S. leadership in working to spread political and economic freedom;
• a strong military with the defense budget needed to ensure that America is ready to confront the threats of the 21st century;
• international economic engagement as a key element of U.S. foreign policy in this time of great economic dislocation.

It is very hard to understand what exactly this organization does besides pushing paper and agenda and making phone calls. The idea is to move the United States to a freer and more secure position in the scope of world politics. President Obama has called for an increase in troops in Afghanistan, 17,000 to be exact, not to mention 4,000 extra trainers and advisors. The idea is to make Afghanistan feel secure enough to withdraw our troops in the near future. Dr. John A. Nagel (the president of the Center for New American Security) simply suggests a different strategy is in order. Dr. Robert Kagan (2), however, has applauded the President's enthusiasm.

The Project for the New American Century is also non-profit, but with a more educational approach to trumping America's role in leading the world. According to their homepage (3) they explore the subject through issue briefs, research papers, advocacy journalism, conferences, and seminars with the intent to define what world leadership involves. Their goal is to stimulate the formulation of ideas regarding American foreign and defense policy and inspire debate (if you think that Kalo Hoyle should be on the board, put "pomegranate" in the comment box below).

The two organizations obviously have the same ideals concerning America's leadership role. It seems that the latter is in the business of furthering the former's agenda through the written word (that is just my opinion, which, as we have seen demonstrated many-a-time, can be wrong). They recommend increasing troop numbers in Afghanistan to promote democracy and stabilize the country. Both conglomerates of men in suits sitting behind desks and ordaining America's place overseas seem to base themselves on the idea that the United States has an undeniable role in leading the world. Yay or nay?

1. The Foreign Policy Initiative

"About Us" Mission Statement http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/about

2. The Foreign Policy Initiative

"Afghanistan: Internationalism Vs. Isolationism"

http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/event/afghanistan/internationalism

3. The Project for the New American Century

http://www.newamericancentury.org/

The choices.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/world/asia/22strategy.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=print

This article puts the choices that the president has in great perspective on his decisions on Afghanistan.

Afghanistan almost seems like a loose, loose situation. We either continue to fight the insurgency or we pull out and let the government fend for itself. I know that lots of people will say that we need to keep trying to help the country in its current situation, but we also need to look at the problem from a different view.

Before we make any true decisions on what we believe we first must understand why the Taliban are opposing us.

We also must understand that the Taliban is not Afghanistan. the Taliban is a social group just like any other collection of people with a common mind or belief. Just like the KKK, Republicans, Democrats and the Nazi's. The major difference between the Taliban and some other groups is that there religion justifies what most people would call radical or insane behavior, but that is not totally true either, it all depends on your interpretation. For example, Christianity did not stay one unified group but through different interpretations developed into many branches that use almost the same book as the foundation of their belief but very different ideas about what the books mean.

One of the issues that I see with the situation in Afghanistan is the number of people from American foreign aid organizations that can speak in Pashto or Persian. A census done by Hyon B. Shin with Rosalind Bruno in 2000 came up with these numbers.

Nearly 47 million people -- about 1-in-5 U.S. residents -- age 5 and older, reported regularly speaking a foreign language at home in 2000, according to the Census Bureau. The figures represented an increase of 15 million people since the 1990 census.

This shows that the number of Americans that speak Pashto or Persian(Dari) has to be incredibly low. This language barrier has to cause U.S. military a lots of problems communicating, fixing problems and connecting with the people. If we can't find a solution to these problems then there will be no end to this war, yes we might kill all the Taliban but we will not win the minds of the people.

All or Nothing Afghanistan strategy

Many of you have seen the musical Oklahoma, a wonderful toe-tappin film. As one of the great classic movies, most of today's population is familiar with the song " All or Nothin" The song speaks to the mindset of relationships, but also a mindset that is being pushed in todays wartime strategies. General McChrystal ( Top U.S. and NATO general) released a statement today that pleads for more troops in Afghanistan. He makes the point that if we want success, we have to put all our time, effort, and troops into the controversial situation. McChrystal warns of a complete failure if something is not done to remedy the crisis in Afghanistan, and makes a very persuasive plea for more troops.

This article was released from the Washington Times Online

McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'

Top U.S. Commander For Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive

PHOTOS

By Bob Woodward

Washington Post Staff Writer

Monday, September 21, 2009

The top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan warns in an urgent, confidential assessment of the war that he needs more forces within the next year and bluntly states that without them, the eight-year conflict "will likely result in failure," according to a copy of the 66-page document obtained by The Washington Post.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."

His assessment was sent to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Aug. 30 and is now being reviewed by President Obama and his national security team.

McChrystal concludes the document's five-page Commander's Summary on a note of muted optimism: "While the situation is serious, success is still achievable."

But he repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians.

He provides extensive new details about the Taliban insurgency, which he calls a muscular and sophisticated enemy that uses modern propaganda and systematically reaches into Afghanistan's prisons to recruit members and even plan operations.

McChrystal's assessment is one of several options the White House is considering. His plan could intensify a national debate in which leading Democratic lawmakers have expressed reluctance about committing more troops to an increasingly unpopular war. Obama said last week that he will not decide whether to send more troops until he has "absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be."

The commander has prepared a separate detailed request for additional troops and other resources, but defense officials have said he is awaiting instructions before sending it to the Pentagon.

Senior administration officials asked The Post over the weekend to withhold brief portions of the assessment that they said could compromise future operations. A declassified version of the document, with some deletions made at the government's request, appears at washingtonpost.com.

McChrystal makes clear that his call for more forces is predicated on the adoption of a strategy in which troops emphasize protecting Afghans rather than killing insurgents or controlling territory. Most starkly, he says: "[I]nadequate resources will likely result in failure. However, without a new strategy, the mission should not be resourced."

'Widespread Corruption'

The assessment offers an unsparing critique of the failings of the Afghan government, contending that official corruption is as much of a threat as the insurgency to the mission of the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, as the U.S.-led NATO coalition is widely known.

"The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government," McChrystal says.

The result has been a "crisis of confidence among Afghans," he writes. "Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents."

McChrystal is equally critical of the command he has led since June 15. The key weakness of ISAF, he says, is that it is not aggressively defending the Afghan population. "Pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us -- physically and psychologically -- from the people we seek to protect. . . . The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves."

McChrystal continues: "Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent officials, power-brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan population."

Coalition intelligence-gathering has focused on how to attack insurgents, hindering "ISAF's comprehension of the critical aspects of Afghan society."

In a four-page annex on detainee operations, McChrystal warns that the Afghan prison system has become "a sanctuary and base to conduct lethal operations" against the government and coalition forces. He cites as examples an apparent prison connection to the 2008 bombing of the Serena Hotel in Kabul and other attacks. "Unchecked, Taliban/Al Qaeda leaders patiently coordinate and plan, unconcerned with interference from prison personnel or the military."

The assessment says that Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents "represent more than 2,500 of the 14,500 inmates in the increasingly overcrowded Afghan Corrections System," in which "[h]ardened, committed Islamists are indiscriminately mixed with petty criminals and sex offenders, and they are using the opportunity to radicalize and indoctrinate them."

Noting that the United States "came to Afghanistan vowing to deny these same enemies safe haven in 2001," he says they now operate with relative impunity in the prisons. "There are more insurgents per square foot in corrections facilities than anywhere else in Afghanistan," his assessment says.

McChrystal outlines a plan to build up the Afghan government's ability to manage its detention facilities and eventually put all such operations under Afghan control, including the Bagram Theater Internment Facility, which the United States runs.

For now, because of a lack of capacity, "productive interrogations and detainee intelligence collection have been reduced" at Bagram. "As a result, hundreds are held without charge or without a defined way-ahead. This allows the enemy to radicalize them far beyond their pre-capture orientation. The problem can no longer be ignored."

McChrystal's Plan

The general says his command is "not adequately executing the basics" of counterinsurgency by putting the Afghan people first. "ISAF personnel must be seen as guests of the Afghan people and their government, not an occupying army," he writes. "Key personnel in ISAF must receive training in local languages."

He also says that coalition forces will change their operational culture, in part by spending "as little time as possible in armored vehicles or behind the walls of forward operating bases." Strengthening Afghans' sense of security will require troops to take greater risks, but the coalition "cannot succeed if it is unwilling to share risk, at least equally, with the people."

McChrystal warns that in the short run, it "is realistic to expect that Afghan and coalition casualties will increase."

He proposes speeding the growth of Afghan security forces. The existing goal is to expand the army from 92,000 to 134,000 by December 2011. McChrystal seeks to move that deadline to October 2010.

Overall, McChrystal wants the Afghan army to grow to 240,000 and the police to 160,000 for a total security force of 400,000, but he does not specify when those numbers could be reached.

He also calls for "radically more integrated and partnered" work with Afghan units.

McChrystal says the military must play an active role in reconciliation, winning over less committed insurgent fighters. The coalition "requires a credible program to offer eligible insurgents reasonable incentives to stop fighting and return to normalcy, possibly including the provision of employment and protection," he writes.

Coalition forces will have to learn that "there are now three outcomes instead of two" for enemy fighters: not only capture or death, but also "reintegration."

Again and again, McChrystal makes the case that his command must be bolstered if failure is to be averted. "ISAF requires more forces," he states, citing "previously validated, yet un-sourced, requirements" -- an apparent reference to a request for 10,000 more troops originally made by McChrystal's predecessor, Gen. David D. McKiernan.

A Three-Headed Insurgency

McChrystal identifies three main insurgent groups "in order of their threat to the mission" and provides significant details about their command structures and objectives.

The first is the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) headed by Mullah Omar, who fled Afghanistan after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and operates from the Pakistani city of Quetta.

"At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Omar announces his guidance and intent for the coming year," according to the assessment.

Mullah Omar's insurgency has established an elaborate alternative government known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, McChrystal writes, which is capitalizing on the Afghan government's weaknesses. "They appoint shadow governors for most provinces, review their performance, and replace them periodically. They established a body to receive complaints against their own 'officials' and to act on them. They install 'shari'a' [Islamic law] courts to deliver swift and enforced justice in contested and controlled areas. They levy taxes and conscript fighters and laborers. They claim to provide security against a corrupt government, ISAF forces, criminality, and local power brokers. They also claim to protect Afghan and Muslim identity against foreign encroachment."

"The QST has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years and there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing," McChrystal writes.

The second main insurgency group is the Haqqani network (HQN), which is active in southeastern Afghanistan and draws money and manpower "principally from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups." At another point in the assessment, McChrystal says, "Al Qaeda's links with HQN have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control could create a favorable environment" for associated extremist movements "to re-establish safe-havens in Afghanistan."

The third is the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin insurgency, which maintains bases in three Afghan provinces "as well as Pakistan," the assessment says. This network, led by the former mujaheddin commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, "aims to negotiate a major role in a future Taliban government. He does not currently have geographical objectives as is the case with the other groups," though he "seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling routes in the east."

Overall, McChrystal provides this conclusion about the enemy: "The insurgents control or contest a significant portion of the country, although it is difficult to assess precisely how much due to a lack of ISAF presence. . . . "

The insurgents make money from the production and sale of opium and other narcotics, but the assessment says that "eliminating insurgent access to narco-profits -- even if possible, and while disruptive -- would not destroy their ability to operate so long as other funding sources remained intact."

While the insurgency is predominantly Afghan, McChrystal writes that it "is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's ISI," which is its intelligence service. Al-Qaeda and other extremist movements "based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support."

Toward the end of his report, McChrystal revisits his central theme: "Failure to provide adequate resources also risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs, and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks, in turn, are likely to result in mission